

Cooperation  $\neq$  Consent:

How Women React to Their Place, based on Social Relations and Ambivalent Sexism

Mina Cikara

Princeton University

Susan T. Fiske

Princeton University

Chapter to appear in S. J. Correll (Ed.), *Social Psychology of Gender: Advances in Group*

*Processes*. Elsevier Science.

This chapter examines the tension between interdependence and dominance. First, we briefly review prominent social psychological theories regarding the development and maintenance of status systems. Next we briefly describe how these structures help distribute social power in modern society. We then examine how prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination stem from status systems and interdependence, using the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Xu, Glick, & Cuddy, 1999; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Next, we consider the unique circumstances of gender relations and how they give way to complementary justifications of gender inequality, using Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999; 2001a; 2001b). Last, we review evidence to support our argument that women do not necessarily acquiesce joyfully to the present hierarchical arrangement, but rather guide their choices by their pragmatic alternatives, as dictated by benevolent and hostile ideologies.

### The Game of Life

To play a game, one must be familiar with the rules. If not familiar, one quickly learns the rules as one goes along or else risks being ejected from the game. In the game of life, status systems comprise a major part of the social structure that shapes our perceptions, thoughts, and behaviors as we move through our daily lives. In any game, the patterns of cooperation and competition matter as well, and players have to know whose side they share. That is, they need to know the interdependence structures as well as the status system, to stay in the game.

#### *The Rules: Status Systems*

Status refers to one's position in a social hierarchy. By some definitions, status is a reward that people *earn* by being exemplary group members. People are seen as good group members if they conform to group norms, facilitate achievement of the group's goals, and put the group's interests before their own (Cohen & Zhou, 1991). This would be one form of achieved

status. Accomplishments earn another form of achieved status. Lay people often view status as earned, assuming that people get what they deserve, as demonstrated by Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980), and world-wide correlations between perceived status and perceived competence (Cuddy, Fiske, Kwan, et al., in press; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2006).

Rather than always being earned, however, status is also *ascribed* to certain individuals or groups, based on innate characteristics such as gender, race, age, attractiveness, etc. (Ridgeway, 1991). Expectation States Theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Webster & Foschi, 1988) suggests that social groups are inextricably linked to social hierarchies because stereotypes encompass explicit ideas regarding different groups' status (or contribution to the group), in addition to traits and roles (Ridgeway, 2001). Status beliefs consistently associate higher status groups with greater competence and valued skills (Webster & Foschi, 1988).

Status beliefs could be particularly potent if both dominant and subordinate groups endorse them, as a result of individuals' need to justify their social systems (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The dominant group maintains social power and wider access to material resources because the shared expectation is that they are more competent, and thus better qualified to perform in instrumental capacities (self-other performance expectations; Ridgeway, 2001). Greater skills and the resulting legitimacy, afforded the dominant group, lead to more power (Carli, 1991). It is thus easy to imagine how the dominant group might subscribe to the status quo.

Furthermore, shared status beliefs are most likely to develop among groups who *must* cooperate with one another to get what they want and need (Glick & Fiske, 1999). This poses the more problematic case: Although women need men as much as vice versa, their lower-status

position would hardly seem something to celebrate and cherish. And yet women cooperate, for the most part, in the existing status relation. System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) argues that subordinate groups endorse status hierarchies because system stability affords security. We will argue that when women are aware of the rules of the game, they may feel compelled to go along, even if they do not necessarily endorse the status beliefs.

### *The Prize: Social Power*

As with all games, the game of life has a prize in for which players compete: Power. Whether conscious or unconscious, the choice to compete for power comes with the game; status systems automatically make one a competitor.

Power may be defined as “relative control over another’s valued outcomes” (Fiske, 1993; see also Fiske & Berdahl, in press; Keltner, et al., 2003). This definition casts power in terms of its structural properties in social relations. In lay terms, one might consider power to mean brute force, which ignores the target’s volition (Raven, 1993, 2001). However, brute force is not useful in the context of gender relations because at a group level, most men do not often express this kind of power over women (although, arguably, the mere threat of such brute force can effectively deter rebellion).

Instead we will focus on the distinction between soft and harsh power, as conceptualized in the Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). Soft power uses social outcomes (liking and respect), whereas harsh power uses physical and economic outcomes (necessities for health and material well-being, respectively). The use of power is easier to recognize as outcomes become more objective and tangible (e.g., control over food or employee promotions); power use is more difficult to recognize as outcomes become more subjective and intangible (e.g., liking and respect). The latter, more subtle type of power

better characterizes gender relations than does brute force. Note that soft power specifies a range of valued outcomes that men and women might seek from each other, as the rest of this chapter emphasizes.

Despite what the labels might seem to imply, harsh power is no more effective than soft power is; the strength of power is determined by the value of the controlled outcome, which depends on the situation. Men have systemic power because women depend on them for economic support more than vice versa. Women have close-relationship power because men depend on them for offspring and emotional support; here women's level of power equals or surpasses men's power.

The power dynamic between men and women is less about one group's conscious need to influence and dominate a subordinate group and more about power as a derivative of the hierarchical gender system that is in place, combined with intimate interdependence. Whether or not the dominant group wishes to influence the subordinate group, and whether or not the subordinate group wants to acquiesce, the mere fact of one group's relatively greater control over valued outcomes yields power differentials (Fiske, 1993). As just noted, the pervasive nature of status beliefs about men and women legitimizes a system in which men have relatively more control than do women in public domains (e.g. professional settings), whereas women are thought to have relatively more control than men in private domains (e.g. the home). These widely held beliefs about control and the legitimacy of how control is distributed among men and women serve to justify and maintain the current system.

Note that status is not tantamount to power. Status refers to one's position in a hierarchy, whereas power concerns outcome control. While the two are deeply intertwined, status and power are distinct constructs in that one can have high status and low outcome control (e.g.,

debutante, lame-duck politician), as well as low status and high outcome control (e.g., garbage collector, corrupt DMV worker). Power and status can also shift depending on the context and the groups in question. Nevertheless, status and group interdependence play an enormous role in the content of the beliefs groups maintain about each other, the emotions they feel toward one another, and the behavior they enact if and when they engage one another.

### Whose Side Are You On?

In any game people are quick to identify allies as well as foes. It is important for people to know which players they should help and rely on for help, as well as which players they should watch carefully. As we will see, this information guides interaction not only between women and men, but among all groups.

People like to have a distinctive and positive group membership, according to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Group identity and its boundaries engender ingroup favoritism, which in turn reinforces social categories (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Favoritism involves resources, such that groups reserve resources for those they favor and withhold resources from those they derogate. Though evidence for ingroup favoritism outweighs outgroup derogation, ingroup favoritism hurts the outgroup by exclusion. However, as we know from the power literature, resources can be widely construed, and power derives from the *value* of the resource in a given context. One possible resource is the reputation of a group or of an individual as a member of that group. As discussed earlier, soft power, or control over social resources (e.g. liking, respect), is no less effective than harsh power in maintaining the status quo. Groups in power may either control the distribution of intergroup images or at least the images they hold carry more impact because the powerful also control other resources, such as money and access (e.g., white directors' depictions of minorities as villains in films). The

stereotypes people hold about various cultural groups thus manifest soft power. Consider the generally positive evaluations (liking and respect) of culturally dominant groups (e.g. Whites, Christians), and the overtly negative evaluations (disliking and disrespect) of less culturally valued groups (e.g. drug addicts, welfare recipients).

The prejudice, or antipathy (as it is defined in Allport, 1954) reflected in negative outgroup stereotypes also stems from the perceived incompatibility of the ingroup's and outgroup's goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993) ("if you're not with me, you're against me"). In other words, competition should breed antipathy, but recent research demonstrates that the situation is more complicated than that. Given the stereotype-setting role of the dominant group, what happens when the dominant group needs the outgroup? What attitudes are reserved for outgroups on which the ingroup relies? What about groups that pose no threat to their status? How are boundaries and hierarchy between dominant and subordinate groups maintained, if not by antipathy?

#### *The Teams: The Importance of Warmth and Competence*

Gender represents one category boundary along which team lines can be drawn. Men and women differ in their stereotypic specialties, which helps explain how they resolve the tension between intimacy and disparity. The Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, in press; Fiske et al., 1999; 2002) organizes beliefs about cultural groups (including gender groups) along two dimensions: competence and warmth. The SCM posits that the content of a stereotype and type of prejudice reserved for a social group follows from their perceived cooperation and status in society. In other words, the way an ingroup feels about an outgroup will depend on the perceived *intent* and *capability* of the outgroup to harm the ingroup. Whether an outgroup is cooperative or competitive will determine if they have intent to harm the ingroup, which will

guide perceptions of the outgroup's warmth. Likewise, whether an outgroup does or does not have high status will determine if they have capability to harm the ingroup, which will guide perceptions of the outgroup's competence. This 2 (intent: low/high warmth) X 2 (capability: low/high competence) mapping of intergroup space yields four classes of stereotypes. Groups high on both warmth and competence are the ingroup and its allies; groups low on both are the worst off (homeless, addicted, or poor people). Groups high on one dimension but low on the other are most relevant to gender relations: Paternalistic pity targets allegedly warm but incompetent groups such as older or disabled people and (in some samples) housewives. Envious prejudice targets allegedly competent but cold groups, such as rich, Jewish, or Asian people in American samples.

According to the SCM, structural relations between groups cause specific stereotypes, which in turn maintain the status quo and defend the position of societal reference groups. As mentioned, favorable stereotypes are reserved for the ingroup, its allies, and cultural default groups. These groups are perceived as both warm and competent as a function of ingroup favoritism. They have no reason nor intent to compete with themselves and are therefore liked and respected. Liking and respect, in turn, legitimize the social power of the ingroup. Cultural prototypes (middle-class, heterosexual, Christian) exemplify this quadrant.

Conversely, derogatory stereotypes describe outgroups that are seen as competitive and having low status (e.g. homeless people). Because these groups are thought to usurp economic and political capital that would otherwise go to higher status groups in society, they are seen as competing in a zero-sum distribution of resources. These groups are seen as having low warmth and low competence, and are disliked and disrespected as a result. Disliking and disrespect undermine the social power of these groups.



In addition to uniform favoritism and derogation, the SCM allows for mixed content stereotypes in which groups can be seen as having high warmth and low competence, or as having low warmth and high competence. Paternalistic stereotypes depict groups that are neither inclined nor capable of competing with the ingroup, meaning they have low status and are not seen as competitive (e.g., elderly people, and in some samples, homemakers; e.g., Eckes, 2002). These groups do not threaten the ingroup and are therefore seen as incompetent but warm. This stereotype encourages paternalistic prejudice, which disrespects competence and rewards socially desirable, but deferent qualities (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Ridgeway, 2001). Paternalistic prejudice promotes compliance from subordinates with minimal conflict, allowing dominant groups to feel their higher status is justified or earned (Jackman, 1994). The White Man's Burden (colonists allegedly civilizing purported savages) provides one example, as does the stereotypic chivalrous man saving the damsel in distress.

In contrast, envious stereotypes are reserved for groups that have attained high status and are therefore seen as competitive (e.g. Asians, career women). Envious prejudice guides the ingroup to elevate its ratings of the outgroup's competence due to the outgroup's apparent power or success, but to lower its ratings of warmth to justify the ingroup's negative reactions toward the outgroup.

In short, the origin of each of these four classes of stereotypes may vary, but their function is the same in each case: They legitimize the current social structure and as long as they persist, continue to reinforce it.

Blocking or rejecting the power of disliked and/or disrespected groups maintains existing power hierarchies. As individuals' power increases, their evaluations of others become increasingly negative, and their evaluations of self become increasingly positive (Georgesens &

Harris, 1998; 2000), potentially leading powerholders to believe they know what is best for everyone. Even disadvantaged groups may identify with certain aspects of the culturally dominant group and endorse its viewpoint. Not only do low-status groups explicitly (Haines & Jost, 2000) and implicitly (Jost, Pelham, Brett, & Carvallo, 2002) favor high-status groups, but the more disadvantaged a group is, the more likely that group is to defend the status quo (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).

Note that a great deal of prejudice is enacted by ingroups withholding resources and positive attributes from outgroups (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000; Mummendey, 1995). When the ingroup is men and the context is a professional setting (i.e., a setting where men are the culturally dominant group), different kinds of resources, when withheld, can undermine the social power of women (the outgroup, in this case). The SCM tells us that liking and respect are two of the most important social resources in determining how much power a group has relative to other groups in society. Cooperation is associated with warmth, which earns liking, but not respect. Competition is associated with status, which wins respect, but not liking. Thus women, depending on how competent and warm they appear to be, may be denied liking and/or respect. We will return to this idea later.

### *Subtypes of Women*

In the case of gender, paternalistic prejudice rewards women who relegate themselves to traditional roles by attributing to them more socially desirable traits (e.g. patience, warmth). In essence, warmth is a consolation prize for forgoing competition with men for social power. When women transgress gender norms of femininity by taking on a nontraditional role, one way to penalize their increase in status or their competition is to cast their behavior in a negative light, though this is not always done consciously. As predicted by envious prejudice and explained by

the SCM, the negative reactions that arise as a result of competition posed by nontraditional women justify the dominant group's resentment of them, penalizing women's traditional advantage on the perceived warmth dimension. Note that most of the time professional women are perceived to be neither as warm nor as competent as men, but occasionally people confront women whom they cannot help but see as qualified due to their glaring successes (e.g., eBay CEO, Meg Whitman).

Contemporary subtypes of women exemplify groups that would fall in the mixed (i.e., paternalistic or envious) stereotype categories. On average, women are thought to have less status than are men, but status can vary depending on the role of the woman in question. Once her status is assessed, the resulting nature of her relationship with men (i.e., cooperative or competitive) follows, ultimately determining whether she elicits paternalistic or envious prejudice. For example, a female homemaker is seen as cooperative because she has taken on a traditionally female role, but is also seen as low-status because she is presumed to have little to no income and relatively less education than a typical man; she is perceived as warm, but not competent. A female professional, on the other hand, contradicts stereotypes regarding women's normal status, and given the associations between status and power, can be seen as a formidable competitor. She is seen as having high status because she is presumed to have acquired a certain level of education and a considerable income, and is seen as competitive because she has managed to take on a traditionally male role. Thus, she is admittedly competent, but not warm.

Where a woman falls in the SCM depends on what "kind" of woman she is. Rather, evaluations of a woman will depend on the context or role in which she is being evaluated. Different subtypes of women include, but are not limited to: respected but disliked women (e.g. business women, feminists) and disrespected but liked women (e.g. housewife, secretary)

(Deaux, Winton, Crowley, & Lewis, 1985; Eckes, 1994; 2002; Noseworthy & Lott, 1984; Six & Eckes, 1991).

The SCM says that content of stereotypes and emotions elicited by different social groups can be predicted by how competitive or cooperative groups are (perceived warmth), in addition to how able they are to make good on any threat to the ingroup (perceived competence). While the relative status and nature of groups' interdependence are clear factors in determining the social structures that shape male-female relations, several factors unique to gender further complicate the multiple forms of prejudice put forth by the SCM. In the specific case of men and women, Ambivalent Sexism Theory digs deeper to explicate the institutions and mechanisms by which gender inequality persists.

#### Knowing the Players: Unique Nature of Gender Relations

##### *Ambivalent Sexism Theory: Benevolent and Hostile Sexism*

When the players of the game are men and women, slightly different rules apply. As we will review, three factors, unique to gender relations, complicate the manner in which the game is played and determine how much players ultimately win from playing.

The extremity with which people generate and rate different subtypes of women provides some insight into the complexity of attitudes people have about them. Like the Stereotype Content Model, Ambivalent Sexism Theory (AST; Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999; 2001a; 2001b) contends that prejudice against women is not rooted in absolute antipathy. Rather, sexism combines complimentary gender ideologies (respectively, positive and negative in flavor), held by men and women worldwide (Glick, Fiske, et al., 2000). These ideologies promote the persistence of gender inequality. Benevolent sexism is a paternalistic ideology that views women as subordinate, best suited for traditional, low-status roles; women need to be protected,

cherished, and revered for their virtue. Hostile sexism, a closer relative of mere antipathy, is a combative ideology maintaining that women seek to control men and use sexuality or feminist ideology as a means to achieving status.

Hostile Sexism and Benevolent Sexism follow predictably from the power differences and interdependence between men and women in all domains of everyday life. Specifically, patriarchy, gender differentiation, and heterosexual relations constitute the structural foundations of Ambivalent Sexism. To some extent, these foundations mirror SCM's structural concepts "status" and "interdependence": patriarchal or male societal power mirrors the SCM status concept. The SCM interdependence concept appears in the simultaneous deeply cooperative but potentially contentious nature of heterosexuality and the cooperative nature of women and men's traditional role differentiation but the competitive nature of nontraditional role enactments. Hence, patriarchy, gender differentiation, and heterosexual relations specifically are unique to gender relations, and give rise to a specific set of behavioral outcomes for men and women in both the private and public domains. As AST describes, each of these institutions has a benevolent and a hostile component, giving way to complementary justifications for gender inequality.

The institution of patriarchy (male hegemony) yields paternalism, the ideological justification of male dominance. The hostile elements of patriarchy are based in dominative paternalism, the prescription that men ought to have more power than women and the contention that women might usurp men's power. As a complement, the benevolent elements of patriarchy are based in protective paternalism, the belief that men need to protect and provide for the women because they are weak.

Gender differentiation refers to the social distinctions all cultures make between men and women, and the importance of gender identity in social hierarchy (Harris, 1991). Competitive gender differentiation, rooted in antipathy theories of prejudice, accounts for the idea that, because of women's lower status, stereotypes associated with women inherently comprise inferiority and incompetence. On the other hand, complementary gender differentiation stresses the functionality of women in gender-conventional roles and accounts for the view that women are "wonderful" because they are nurturing and supportive (Eagly & Mladinic, 1993) or possess a moral purity.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the necessary condition of heterosexual relations and sexual reproduction highlight the interpersonal interdependence of men and women. The hostile interpretation of this interdependence is that women are purportedly able to use sex to control men, whereas the benevolent interpretation asserts that women are a valuable resource (e.g. essential for men's true happiness), even if they are inferior.

Both men and women report subscribing to these ideologies, albeit to varying degrees (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998), and these ideologies suggest how gender inequality persists. Men are socially dominant by many accounts (e.g., higher-status roles, greater income) (United Nations Development Programme, 2006), so several mechanisms follow for their role as the higher-status group. As noted, System Justification Theory argues that people are motivated to create beliefs that reinforce the status quo so that they can see the social system in which they live as fair and legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 1994); Social Dominance Theory also posits that people create ideologies ("legitimizing myths") to support the hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Therefore gender stereotypes emerge that reflect the current system. The dominant group also has incentive to reward subordinates, on whom they rely, for warmth and cooperation.

Additionally, being hostile alone would never work to keep the subordinates in check (Glick & Fiske, 1999). According to the Metamorphic Theory of power (Kipnis, 1976; 1984), overt control leads powerholders and targets to attribute targets' behavior to force, which leads the powerholder to perceive the target as weak, and the target to resent the powerholder. As soon as the powerholder is no longer present, the target will cease to enact the desired behavior. On the other hand, relational tactics lead both parties to perceive choice in the target's behavior, which allows the target to maintain self-respect and encourages self-sustaining behavior. Relational tactics suggest one way that women maintain the system, by some degree of perceived choice. This is essential, for the hierarchical gender system would never sustain itself for this long if it were maintained only by brute force.

Instead, dominant groups endorse paternalistic ideologies that offer help and protection to subordinates in order to justify the hierarchy (Jackman, 1994). The system is arranged so that dominants confer benefits upon the subordinates to keep them complacent. Subordinates, ever sensitive to their position and the cultural view, are influenced by status beliefs in their own behavior, and cooperate to maintain amicable conditions (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). In part, Benevolent Sexism stems from the perceived willing cooperation of the subordinates. Additionally, seemingly "protective" gestures allow dominants to see subordinates as less competent while turning a blind eye to discriminatory acts (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 2001). In other words, dominants can deny subordinates education, organizational power, and economic participation under the guise of protection (Glick et al., 2000). If the subordinates go along with the arrangement, dominants are free to assume subordinates' consent. If subordinates reject the "benefits," thereby refusing to cooperate, the dominants will react with hostility toward the subordinates, because they believe it is their right to maintain the system.

Ambivalent Sexism Theory builds on the existing theories of gender inequality by demonstrating why it is that both hostile and benevolent ideologies contribute to persistent prejudice and discrimination against women. First, although Benevolent Sexism is seemingly innocuous, and in certain situations perceived as beneficial, it is problematic because it is yoked to hostile sexism; Benevolent Sexism does not exist without Hostile Sexism and the resulting prejudice and discrimination. Data from more than 15,000 participants in 19 countries illustrates that Benevolent and Hostile Sexism are highly correlated with one another, and negatively correlated with other indicators of gender equality in economic and political life (Glick, Fiske, et al., 2000). Second, Benevolent Sexism is selectively favorable only toward women who occupy traditional female roles. Ambivalent sexists reconcile their presumably conflicting ideologies about women by reserving benevolent beliefs for traditional women and hostile beliefs for nontraditional women (Glick, et al., 1997). Third, Benevolent Sexism reduces women's resistance to prejudice and discrimination, because benevolence is often used to justify hostile acts. For example, women with higher Benevolent Sexism scores rated both interpersonal discrimination (e.g., husband forbids wife from going out at night) and professional discrimination (e.g., boss promotes male employee instead of female employee, even though she is more qualified) as less serious when the perpetrator cited benevolent justifications (e.g. for their protection). Furthermore, higher Benevolent Sexism scores predicted women's greater tolerance for husbands' overtly hostile discrimination, though this last finding only held for women without paid employment (Moya, Exposito, & Casado, 1999). Lastly, Benevolent Sexism is dangerous because it highlights stereotypic differences between men and women contributing to the belief in innate gender differences.



Recent work reveals that Benevolent and Hostile Sexism are related to several practices, individual differences, and behaviors that predict prejudice and discrimination against women. The likelihood of individuals passing on female- and male-disparaging jokes, as well as how funny men think they are is predicted by Hostile Sexism, and the relationship between Hostile Sexism and likelihood to pass on disparaging jokes is mediated by perceived funniness (Thomas & Esses, 2004). Education is negatively related to Benevolent and Hostile Sexism, and Catholicism predicts more Benevolent, but not Hostile Sexism (Glick, Lameiras, & Castro, 2002). In Turkey and Brazil, Hostile Sexism predicts men and women's justification of violence against wives. Furthermore, the alleged protection promoted by Benevolent Sexism is contingent on wives occupying traditional roles and remaining subordinate to husbands' authority (Glick, Sakali-Urgulu, Ferreira, & Aguiar de Souza, 2002).

So do women go along to avoid brutality? Or do they really endorse the system, because they want it both ways (protection *and* equal rights)? Only one study that we are aware of addresses this question directly. Women rated profiles of benevolent sexists and hostile sexists as mildly favorable and highly unfavorable, respectively, and 44% of them simultaneously approved of the benevolent sexist and disapproved of the hostile sexist (Kilianski & Rudman, 1998). Nevertheless, on average participants thought it was unlikely that the two profiles described the same person indicating that they underestimate ambivalent prejudice.

#### *Implications of Status Beliefs and Roles for Women*

As discussed, Expectation States Theory (Berger et al., 1977; Webster & Foschi, 1988) tells us that gender is inextricably linked to social hierarchy because gender stereotypes explicitly describe men and women's status in addition to traits and roles (Ridgeway, 2001). Furthermore, men and women have to work together in order to get what they need and want.

Two significant trends emerge as a result of this cooperative interdependence: (1) the status differentiating qualities of both groups are more likely to be highlighted than are other qualities, and (2) the dominant group, when unchallenged, is likely to interpret cooperation of the subordinate group as consent. So, on the surface, men and women contentedly continue the present arrangement, and both groups do the necessary cognitive gymnastics to make sense of the way things are (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Another possible interpretation is that it's not just system justification in the sense of sacrificing the self for the sake of the system. It may be that women are just choosing the lesser of two evils. Gender is one of, if not the most salient social category (Fiske, 1998; Stroessner, 1996) and gender stereotyping is often automatic or unconscious (Dunning & Sherman, 1997). In other words, the mere sight of a woman can immediately elicit a specific set of traits and attributions, depending on context (category-based perception; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Social-role theory (Eagly, 1987) suggests that gendered division of labor is the source of the stereotypes we hold about women and men to this day. Women are associated with domestic roles (e.g. mother), which require communal qualities (e.g. warmth, patience), whereas men are associated with high-status roles (e.g. professional), which require agentic traits (e.g. competence, independence). Thus, the "work" roles associated with each gender have shaped the content of the stereotypes people hold about men and women. While the content of stereotypes for women may seem subjectively positive, public domains make it clear that these "favorable" attitudes are predicated on women occupying low-status roles.

People have learned to think about women in a certain way, and women can go along with it or not go along with it. Given the features of gender relations--the clearly defined and deeply embedded hierarchy, the automatically accessed roles, and the pervasive benevolent and

hostile ideologies that dictate social rewards and punishments--women in the public domain face a Catch-22 every day. They have to make a choice: Will they cooperate or compete? What risk do they run if they compete, choosing to challenge the status quo?

### Pay to Play?

In many domains, men continue to surpass women in power and status (Pratto & Walker, 2001). Even when their objective behavior is equivalent, men and women are perceived as displaying divergent behaviors and possessing attributes indicative of differences in power, status, and dominance (Heilman, 2001). Moreover, particularly in masculine domains, women's relative power and status may be misperceived as being much lower than objectively indicated. Women have to work harder than men do in order to be perceived as equally competent (Foschi, 2000).

As explained, some dominant group members endorse negative stereotypes that legitimize their privilege and withhold social power from subordinate groups. AST makes specific predictions about possible negative outcomes for women who operate in the public domain while having to navigate the fall-out from benevolent and hostile ideologies. Some negative outcomes include patronizing discrimination, backlash, and sexual harassment, to which we now turn.

### *Playing by the Rules*

In this case, playing by the rules means adopting traditional gender roles and operating within the status system that is already in place. However, as we will see, even when women try to play by the rules, they do not necessarily benefit..

Women are allegedly communal, and men are allegedly agentic (Eagly, 1987), but employees in professional settings who are seen as warm and incompetent elicit patronizing

discrimination (Glick & Fiske, in press). Patronizing behaviors have serious consequences for women in professional settings. Because stereotypes about gender comprise status beliefs (i.e. women have less status than men), less agentic traits, and more communal traits, superiors will tend to hold women to lower stereotyped-based standards in performance settings (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Biernat & Manis, 1994; Biernat, Vesico, & Manis, 1998). In masculine domains, this activation of low or patronizing standards for women can lead evaluators to be more impressed with female candidates than male candidates because the female candidate readily surpasses minimum standards for a woman (a “wow effect”), whereas the male candidate is held to higher, male stereotype-based standards and therefore seems comparatively less impressive (Biernat & Kobrynowicz). Still, this “advantage” does not translate into getting the job because of an enormous behavioral gap between praising an applicant’s qualities and actually putting applicants on the payroll (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001). These decisions distinguish between zero-sum and non-zero-sum behaviors (Biernat et al., 1998), such that zero-sum choices allocate limited but valuable resources (e.g., money, promotions), and non-zero-sum choices dole out unlimited but less-valued resources (e.g., verbal praise, positive nonverbal cues). Non-zero-sum behaviors contrast to stereotypes, as a consequence of shifting standards (e.g. “She did a really great job giving that presentation, for a woman. We should definitely consider her for the job.”). However, the really valuable, limited zero-sum choices assimilate to stereotypes (e.g., men are more competent than women, so hire the man) (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Biernat & Vescio, 2005). Thus, while minimum competence standards are often lower for women, ability standards are actually higher (Foschi, 2001). In other words, while female applicants are likely to appear on the short list, they still lag in hiring, raises, and promotions.

Other more overt manifestations of patronizing discrimination include: handicapping via over-helping (e.g., “there’s no reason why you should have to learn this program, I’ll do it for you”), taking over (e.g., “let me do this project, you seem in over your head”), and limiting the responsibilities of targets (e.g., “you have enough to do as it is; I’ll give this project to him”) (Rudman, Glick, & Phelan, in press). Subordinates (either male or female) respond with anger to patronizing behaviors of powerholders, but men subsequently perform better, whereas women perform worse (Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005).

Patronizing discrimination is embedded in benevolent sexism and serves to maintain the dominant group’s higher status. The double-edged nature of patronizing discrimination is precisely what makes benevolent sexism so insidious. It is not overtly hostile and in many cases is seemingly beneficial to the recipient. Furthermore, perpetrators may think they are helping recipients. Women who accept paternalistic gestures do so either because they are not aware that they are reinforcing their own low-status role, or because they understand they have to cooperate, and accepting benevolent gestures is a better alternative to enduring overt hostility.

### *Not Playing by the Rules*

As noted, women do not necessarily benefit by enacting traditional gender roles; so what happens when they do try to compete? Given existing pervasive gender-status associations, women have to weigh the alternatives of cooperation versus perceived competition. Everyday, women face a paradox in performance settings: They have to provide strong counter-stereotypic information (e.g., that they are agentic and competent) in order to demonstrate that they are qualified for high-status professional roles (Glick, Zion, & Nelson, 1988), but this deviation from prescribed and proscribed gender norms can elicit a *backlash effect* (Rudman, 1998).

Consider the consequences of refusing benevolent gestures or violating feminine norms. If a woman elects to reject patronizing assistance, she is seen uncooperative. As a result, the benefits of paternalism reserved for women who stick to traditional gendered behavior are revoked and backlash rooted in hostile sexism can take its place. Manifestations of backlash include hiring discrimination (Heilman et al., 2004), being judged more harshly (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992), being sabotaged (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004), social exclusion (Jackman, 1994), and being sexually harassed (Fiske & Stevens, 1993). Indeed, research demonstrates that high Hostile Sexism scores, but not Benevolent Sexism scores, are related to more negative evaluations and fewer management recommendations for female candidates, but more management recommendations for male candidates (Masser & Abrams, 2004). Moreover, women are bound by workplace culture norms; research indicates that the social costs of making attributions to discrimination prevent stigmatized individuals from dealing with the discrimination (Kaiser & Miller, 2001).

Hostile ideologies elicited by competitive or counter-normative behaviors promote ideas that can be used to justify resentment. A hostile interpretation of heterosexual intimacy can motivate individuals to infer that female coworkers acquired their positions illegitimately (e.g., by sleeping with a superior), because sexuality is supposedly the domain in which women have the perceived ability to control men. It is hardly a coincidence that men who are most concerned with protecting their status are also the most likely to harass (Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003), and that individuals (male or female), who threaten men's status are most likely to become the targets of harassment (Berdahl, 2004; Dall'Ara & Maass, 2000; Maass et al., 2003). Furthermore, being perceived as "sexy" can elicit hostile reactions, from both men and women, and lead people to perceive sexual harassment as justified (Muehlenhard &

MacNaughton, 1988). Thus, when women compete and threaten to destabilize the current status system, sexual harassment may be one way others attempt to reinforce their place in the hierarchy.

To make matters more complicated, the nonverbal behavioral research suggests that women are facing an uphill battle to preserve their legitimacy once they are in positions of authority. Dominant nonverbal behavior is a major cue to power, as well as a subtle but crucial midpoint along the continuum between covert and overt displays of control (Carli, LeFleur, & Lober, 1995; Henley, 1995; LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003). Henley (1977; 1995) has proposed that many of the nonverbal behaviors that we have learned to attribute to gender differences (e.g., men take up more space, women smile more) can be better explained by dominance and submissiveness (e.g., dominant people maintain a steady gaze, submissive people look away/down more). This proposal does not eliminate gender as a factor as it is true that men tend to display more dominance behaviors while women tend to display more submissive behaviors (Hall, 1984). The trouble lies in the many nonverbal behaviors that function both as dominance cues and cues of intimacy, depending on who is expressing them, when, and where. For example, individuals who touch are seen as more dominant than the target they are touching (Major, 1981), but physical touch between two people is also a clear signal of intimacy and closeness. Given that dominant nonverbal behavior is a central avenue for control that also serves the dual function of communicating intimacy, women who enact these behaviors in an effort to communicate their authority run the risk of being misinterpreted. Indeed, research shows exactly this pattern: not only are dominant behaviors seen as less dominant when displayed by women, they are also seen as more sexual in both dyadic interactions (Henley & Harmon, 1985) and when they are presented alone (Cikara & Morrow, 2004).

When women enact dominant nonverbal behaviors, simultaneously deviating from gender norms and not playing by the rules, they run the risk of being seen as overtly sexual. The misperception of women's dominance behaviors as sexual may be particularly pernicious and may disserve women in at least two ways. First, behavioral confirmation may work in concert with attributions, to restrict women's ability to influence situations and other people. Perhaps rightly, women do not believe that they can be seen simultaneously as competent and sexual (Gutek, 1989). Second, being seen as sexual rather than powerful, women are objectified and diminished, thus making them more likely targets for harassment and unwanted sexual advances. As one might expect, flirtatiousness and harassment have negative consequences for women's self-confidence (Satterfield & Muehlenhard, 1997).

While women tolerate harassment less than men do, Ambivalent Sexism and hostility toward women predicts tolerance of harassment regardless of gender (Russell & Trigg, 2004). And enacting submissiveness is not a solution. Not only does it undermine people's perception of social power, being seen as submissive can also lead to exploitation (Richard, Rollerson, & Phillips, 1970). Our take home message is this: Attributing women's professional success to sexuality, aggression, or coldness strips competence of its relation to legitimate forms of social power and the likelihood of making these attributions can be predicted by the extent to which individuals ascribe to benevolent and hostile ideologies.

### Summary

This chapter examines the tension between interdependence and dominance in gender relations. We reviewed how status systems affect the distribution of social power in modern society as well as how prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination stem from said status systems and intergroup processes. Using Ambivalent Sexism Theory, we discussed the way male



hegemony, gender differentiation, and heterosexual intimacy yield complementary justifications of gender inequality and find that women in the public domain face a difficult choice: cooperate or compete. We reviewed evidence to support our argument that women do not necessarily acquiesce joyfully to the present hierarchical arrangement, but rather guide their decisions by weighing the outcomes of going along to get along against challenging the status quo. Finally, we examine some of the negative consequences women face when they cooperate and when they compete. All this evidence suggests that when women do cooperate in their subordinate status, they do not necessarily accept it.

## References

- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Berdahl, J. L. (2004). The sexual harassment of “masculine” women. Unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto.
- Berger, J., Fisek, M. H., Norman, R. Z., & Zelditch, M. Jr. (1977). *Status characteristics and social interaction: An expectation states approach*. New York: Elsevier.
- Biernat, M., & Fugien, K. (2001). Shifting standards and the evaluation of competence: Complexity in gender-based judgments and decision making. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57, 707-724.
- Biernat, M., & Kobrynowicz, D. (1997). Gender- and race-based standards of competence: Lower minimum standards but higher ability standards for devalued groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72, 544-557.
- Biernat, M., & Manis, M. (1994). Shifting standards and stereotype-based judgments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 5-20.
- Biernat, M., Manis, M., & Nelson, T. F. (1991). Comparison and expectancy processes in human judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61, 203-211.
- Biernat, M., & Vescio T. K. (2002). She swings, she hits, she’s great, she’s benched: Shifting judgment standards and behaviors. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 66-76.
- Biernat, M., & Vescio, T. K., & Manis, M. (1998). Judging and behaving toward members of stereotyped groups: A shifting standards perspective. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, & C. A. Insko (Eds.), *Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior* (pp. 151-175). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.

- Carli, L. L. (1991). Gender, status, and influence. In E. J. Lawler, B. Markovsky, C. L. Ridgeway, & H. Walker (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (Vol. 8, pp. 89-113). Greenwich, CT: JAI.
- Carli, L. L., LaFleur, S. J., & Loeber, C. C. (1995). Nonverbal behavior, gender, and influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68, 1030-1041.
- Cikara, M., & Morrow, J. (May, 2004). Effects of gender and dominance on perceptions of overt sexuality, sexual attractiveness, warmth, and competence. Presented at the American Psychological Society Meeting, Chicago, IL,
- Cohen, B. P., & Zhou, X. (1991). Status processes in enduring work groups. *American Sociological Review*, 56, 179-188.
- Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2004). When professionals become mothers, warmth doesn't cut the ice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 60, 701-718.
- Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (in press). Competence and warmth as universal trait dimensions of interpersonal and intergroup perception: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (New York: Academic Press).
- Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., Kwan, V. S. Y., Glick, P., Demoulin, S., Leyens, J-Ph., Bond, M. H., Croizet, J-C., Ellemers, N., Sleebos, E., Htun, T. T., Yamamoto, M., Kim, H-J., Maio, G., Perry, J., Petkova, K., Todorov, V., Rodríguez-Bailón, R., Morales, E., Moya, M., Palacios, M., Smith, V., Perez, R., Vala, J., & Ziegler, R. (in press). Is the stereotype content model culture-bound? A cross-cultural comparison reveals systematic similarities and differences. *British Journal of Social Psychology*.
- Dall'Ara, E., & Maass, A. (2000). Studying sexual harassment in the laboratory: Are egalitarian

- women at higher risk? *Sex Roles*, 41, 681-704.
- Deaux, K., Winton, W., Crowley, M., & Lewis, L. (1985). Level of categorization and content of gender stereotypes. *Social Cognition*, 3, 145-167.
- Dépret, E. F., & Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and power: Some cognitive consequences of social structure as a source of control deprivation. In G. Weary, F. Gleicher, & K. Marsh (Eds.), *Control motivation and social cognition* (pp. 176-202). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Reducing contemporary prejudice: Combating explicit and implicit bias at the individual and intergroup level. In: S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing prejudice and discrimination* (pp. 137–163). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Dunning, D., & Sherman, D. A. (1997). Stereotypes and tacit inference. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73, 459-471.
- Eagly, A. H. (1987). *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Eagly, A. H., Makhijani, M. G., & Klonsky, B. G. (1992). Gender and the evaluation of leaders: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 111, 3-22.
- Eagly, A. H., Mladinic, A. (1993). Are people prejudiced against women? Some answers from research on attitudes, gender stereotypes and judgments of competence. In W. Strobe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European review of social psychology* (Vol. 5, pp. 1-35). New York: Wiley.
- Eckes, T. (1994). Features of men, features of women: Assessing stereotypic beliefs about gender subtypes. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 33, 107-123.

- Eckes, T. (2002). Paternalistic and envious gender stereotypes: Testing predictions from the Stereotype Content Model. *Sex Roles*, 47, 99-114.
- Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist*, 48, 621-628.
- Fiske, S. T. (1998). Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4<sup>th</sup> ed., pp. 357-411). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Fiske, S. T., & Berdahl, J. (in press). Social power. In A. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Social psychology: A handbook of basic principles* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). New York: Guilford.
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82, 878-902.
- Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 23, pp. 1-74). New York: Academic Press.
- Fiske, S. T., & Ruscher, J. B. (1993). Negative interdependence and prejudice: Whence the affect? In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes and group perception* (pp. 239-268). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Fiske, S. T., & Stevens, L. E. (1993). What so special about sex? Gender stereotyping and discrimination. In S. Okamp, & M. Costanzo (Eds.), *Gender issues in contemporary society* (pp. 173-196). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

- Fiske, S. T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A. C., & Glick, P. (1999). (Dis)respecting versus (dis)liking: Status and interdependence predict ambivalent stereotypes of competence and warmth. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55, 473-489.
- Foschi, M. (2000). Double standards for competence: Theory and research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 21-42.
- Georgesén, J. C., & Harris, M. J. (1998). Why's my boss always holding me down? A meta-analysis of power effects on performance evaluations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 2, 184-195.
- Georgesén, J. C., & Harris, M. J. (2000). The balance of power: Interpersonal consequences of differential power and expectation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26, 1239-1257.
- Glick, P., Diebold, J., Bailey Werner, B., & Zhu, L. (1997). The two faces of Adam: Ambivalent sexism and polarized attitudes toward women. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23, 1323-1334.
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70, 491-512.
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1999). Sexism and other "isms": Interdependence, status, and the ambivalent content of stereotypes. In W. B. Swan, J. H. Langlois, & L. A. Gilbert (Eds.), *Sexism and stereotypes in modern society* (pp. 193-221). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T., (2001a). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender inequality. *American Psychologist*, 56, 109-118.
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T., (2001b). Ambivalent sexism. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in*

- experimental social psychology* (Vol. 33, pp. 115-188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Academic Press.
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2005). Sex discrimination: The psychological approach. To appear in: F. J. Crosby, M. S. Stockdale, and S. A. Ropp (Eds.), *Sex Discrimination in the Workplace*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (in press). Sex discrimination: The psychological approach. In F. J. Crosby, M. S. Stockdale, & S. A. Ropp (Eds.). *Sex discrimination in the workplace*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Glick, P., Fiske, S. T., Mladinic, A., Saiz, J., Abrams, D., Masser, B., Adetoun, B., Osagie, J., Akande, A., Alao, A., Brunner, A., Willemsen, T. M., Chipeta, K., Dardenne, B., Dijksterhuis, A., Wigboldus, D., Eckes, T., Six-Materna, I., Exposito, F., Moya, M., Foddy, M., Kim, H.-J., Lameiras, M., Sotelo, M. J., Mucchi-Faina, A., Romani, M., Sakalli, N., Udegbe, B., Yamamoto, M., Ui, M., Ferreira, M. C., & Lopez, W. L. (2000). Beyond prejudice as simple antipathy: Hostile and benevolent sexism across cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 763-775.
- Glick, P., Lameiras, M., & Castro, Y. R. (2002). Education and catholic religiosity as predictors of hostile and benevolent sexism toward women and men. *Sex Roles*, 47, 433-441.
- Glick, P., Sakali-Urgulu, N., Ferreira, M. C., & deSouza, M. A. (2002). Ambivalent sexism and attitudes toward wife abuse in Turkey and Brazil. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 26, 292-297.
- Glick, P., Zion, C., & Nelson, C. (1988). What mediates sex discrimination in hiring decisions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, 178-186.
- Gutek, B. A. (1989). Sexuality in the workplace: Key issues in social research and organizational

- practice. In J. Hearn, D. L. Sheppard, P. Tancred-Sheriff, & G. Burrell (Eds.), *The sexuality of organization* (pp. 56-70). London: Sage Publications.
- Haines, E. L., & Jost, J. T. (2000). Placating the powerless: Effects of legitimate and illegitimate explanation on effect, memory, and stereotyping. *Social Justice Research, 13*, 219-236.
- Hall, J. A. (1984). *Nonverbal sex differences: Communication accuracy and expressive style*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Harris, M. (1991). *Cultural anthropology* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). New York: Harper Collins.
- Heilman, M. E. (2001). Description and prescription: How gender stereotypes prevent women's ascent up the organizational ladder. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*, 657-674.
- Heilman, M. E., Wallen, A. S., Fuchs, D., & Tamkins, M. M. (2004). Penalties for success: Reactions to women who succeed at male gender-typed tasks. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 89*, 416-427.
- Henley, N. M. (1977). *Body politics: Power, sex, and nonverbal communication*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Henley, N. M. (1995). Body politics revisited: What do we know today? In P. J. Kalbfleisch, & M. J. Cody (Eds.), *Gender, power, and communications in human relationships* (pp. 27-61). Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
- Henley, N. M., & Harmon, S. (1985). The nonverbal semantics of power and gender: a perceptual study. In S. L. Ellyson, & J. F. Dovidio (Eds.), *Power, dominance, and nonverbal behavior* (pp. 151-164). New York: Springer-Verlag
- Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. In S. T. Fiske, D. L. Schacter, & C. Zahn-Waxler (Eds.), *Annual review of psychology* (Vol. 53, pp. 575-604). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.



- Jackman, M. R. (1994). *The velvet glove: Paternalism and conflict in gender, class and race relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 33, 1-27.
- Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Brett, W., & Carvallo, M. R. (2002). Non-conscious forms of system justification: Implicit and behavioral preferences for higher status groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 38, 586-602.
- Jost, J. T., Pelham, B. W., Sheldon, O., & Sullivan, B. N. (2003). Social inequality and the reduction of ideological dissonance on behalf of the system: Evidence of enhanced system justification among the disadvantaged. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 33, 13-36.
- Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2001). Stop complaining! The social costs of making attributions to discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 254-263.
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological Review*, 110, 265-284.
- Killianski, S., & Rudman, L. A. (1998). Wanting it both ways: Do women approve of benevolent sexism? *Sex Roles*, 39, 333-352.
- Kipnis, D. (1976). *The powerholders*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kipnis, D. (1984). The use of power in organization and in interpersonal settings. *Applied Social Psychology Annual*, 5, 179-210.
- LaFrance, M., Hecht, M. A., Paluck, E. L. (2003). The contingent smile: A meta-analysis of sex differences in smiling. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129, 305-334.
- Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The belief in a just world: a fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum.

- Maass, A., Cadinu, M., Guarnieri, G., & Grasselli, A. (2003). Sexual harassment under social identity threat: The computer harassment paradigm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85, 853-780.
- Major, B. (1981). Gender patterns in touching behavior. In C. Mayo & N. M. Henley (Eds.), *Gender and nonverbal behavior* (pp. 15-37). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Masser, B. M., & Abrams, D. (2004). Reinforcing the glass ceiling: The consequences of hostile sexism for female managerial candidates. *Sex Roles*, 51, 609-615.
- Mazur, A. (1985). A biosocial model of status in face-to-face groups. *Social Forces*, 64, 377-402.
- Moya, M., Exposito, F., & Casado, P. (1999). *Women's reactions to hostile and benevolent sexist situations*. Oxford, UK: European Association of Experimental Social Psychology.
- Muehlenhard, C. L., & MacNaughton, J. S. (1988). Women's beliefs about women who "lead men on." *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 7, 65-79.
- Mummendey, A. (1995). Positive distinctiveness and social discrimination: An old couple living in divorce. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 25, 657-670.
- Noseworthy, C. M., & Lott, A. J. (1984). The cognitive organization of gender-stereotypic categories. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 10, 474-481.
- Oldmeadow, J., & Fiske, S. T. (in press). Ideology moderates status = competence stereotypes: Roles for Belief in a Just World and Social Dominance Orientation. *European Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*.
- Pratto, F., & Walker, A. (2001). Dominance in disguise: Power, beneficence, and exploitation in personal relationships. In A. Lee-Chai & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *The use and abuse of power* (pp. 93-114). Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis.

- Raven, B. H. (1993). The bases of power: Origins and recent developments. *Journal of Social Issues, 49*, 227-251.
- Raven, B. H. (2001). Power/interaction and interpersonal influence. In A. Lee-Chai & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *The use and abuse of power* (pp. 217-240). Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis.
- Raven, B. H., Schwarzwald, J., & Koslowsky, M. (1998). Conceptualizing and measuring a power/interaction model of interpersonal influence. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28*, 307-332.
- Richardson, L., Rollerson, B., & Phillips, J. (1970). Perceptions of submissiveness: Implications for victimization. *The Journal of Psychology, 4*, 407-411.
- Ridgeway, C. (1991). The social construction of status value: Gender and other nominal characteristics. *Social Forces, 70*, 367-386.
- Ridgeway, C. (2001). Gender, status, and leadership. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*, 637-655.
- Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counter-stereotypical impression management. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 629-645.
- Rudman, L. A., & Fairchild, K. (2004). Reactions to counterstereotypical behavior: The role of backlash in cultural stereotype maintenance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87*, 157-176.
- Rudman, L. A., Glick, P., & Phelan (in press). From the laboratory to the bench: Gender stereotyping research in the courtroom. In E. Borgida & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), *Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Rudman, L. A., & Goodwin, S. A. (2004). Gender differences in automatic ingroup bias: Why do

- women like women more than men like men? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87, 494-509.
- Russell, B. L., & Trigg, K. Y. (2004). Tolerance of sexual harassment: An examination of gender differences, ambivalent sexism, social dominance, and gender roles. *Sex Roles*, 50, 565-573.
- Satterfield, A. T., & Muehlenhard, C. L. (1997). Shaken confidence: The effects of an authority figure's flirtatiousness on women's and men's self-rated creativity. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 21, 395-416.
- Seachrist, G. B., & Stangor, C. (2001). Perceived consensus influences intergroup behavior and stereotype accessibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80, 645-654.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Six, B., & Eckes, T. (1991). A closer look at the complex structure of gender stereotypes. *Sex Roles*, 24, 57-71.
- Stroessner S. J. (1996). Social categorization by race or sex: Effects of perceived non-normalcy on response times. *Social Cognition*, 14, 247-276.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In J. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson.
- Thomas, C. A., & Esses, V. M. (2004). Individual differences in reaction to sexist humor. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 7, 89-100.
- United Nations Development Programme (2005). *Human development report 2005*. HDR Statistics [On-line]. Available: <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm>

- Vescio, T. K., Gervais, S. J., Snyder, M., & Hoover, A. (2005). Power and the creation of patronizing environments: The stereotype-based behaviors of the powerful and their effects on female performance in masculine domains. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 658-672.
- Webster, M., & Foschi, M. (1988). *Status generalization: New theory and research*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

---

<sup>1</sup> Note that the SCM warmth dimension links both friendly intent and trustworthiness, so it combines these ideas.